### 110TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

# H. R. 2712

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United Nations system, and for other purposes.

### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 14, 2007

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Boozman, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Chabot, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Flake, Mr. Fortuño, Mr. Mack, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. McCotter, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Pence, Mr. Poe, Mr. Rohrabacher, and Mr. Royce) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

## A BILL

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United Nations system, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
- 4 (a) Short Title.—This title may be cited as the
- 5 "United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Re-
- 6 form Act of 2007".
- 7 (b) Table of Contents.—The table of contents is
- 8 as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.

#### TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

- Sec. 101. Findings.
- Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary basis.
- Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States Contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations.

# TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

- Sec. 201. Findings.
- Sec. 202. Definitions.
- Sec. 203. Establishment and management of the Office of the United States
  Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System.
- Sec. 204. Transparency for United States Contributions.
- Sec. 205. Authorization of appropriations.

### TITLE III—UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

- Sec. 301. Annual publication.
- Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
- Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the Security Council.
- Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
- Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
- Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
- Sec. 307. Report on United Nations reform.
- Sec. 308. Report on United Nations personnel.
- Sec. 309. Limitations on United States Contributions to UNRWA.
- Sec. 310. United Nations treaty bodies.
- Sec. 311. Equality at the United Nations.
- Sec. 312. Anti-semitism and the United Nations.
- Sec. 313. Regional group inclusion of Israel.

#### TITLE IV—UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

- Sec. 401. Findings.
- Sec. 402. Human Rights Council membership and funding.

#### TITLE V—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

- Sec. 501. International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Sec. 502. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA.

### TITLE VI—PEACEKEEPING

- Sec. 601. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
- Sec. 602. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
- Sec. 603. Certification.

#### 1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

### 2 In this act:

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1	(1) Employee.—The term "employee" means
2	an individual who is employed in the general serv-
3	ices, professional staff, or senior management of the
4	United Nations, including contractors and consult-
5	ants.
6	(2) GENERAL ASSEMBLY.—The term "General
7	Assembly" means the General Assembly of the
8	United Nations.
9	(3) Member state.—The term "Member
10	State" means a Member State of the United Na-
11	tions. Such term is synonymous with the term
12	"country".
13	(4) Secretary.—The term "Secretary" means
14	the Secretary of State.
15	(5) Secretary General.—The term "Sec-
16	retary General" means the Secretary General of the
17	United Nations.
18	(6) Security Council.—The term "Security
19	Council" means the Security Council of the United
20	Nations.
21	(7) UN.—The term "UN" means the United
22	Nations.
23	(8) Appropriate congressional commit-
24	TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-
25	mittees" means—

1	(A) the Committees on Appropriations,	
2	Foreign Affairs, and Oversight and Government	
3	Reform of the House; and	
4	(B) the Committees on Appropriations,	
5	Foreign Relations, Homeland Security and Gov-	
6	ernmental Affairs of the Senate.	
7	TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE	
8	<b>UNITED NATIONS</b>	
9	SEC. 101. FINDINGS.	
10	The Congress makes the following findings:	
11	(1) According to the White House Office of	
12	Management and Budget, the United States paid	
13	over 5,300,000,000 dollars into the United Nations	
14	system in 2005, significantly more than was paid by	
15	any other nation.	
16	(2) Under current rules and contribution levels,	
17	it is possible to assemble the two-thirds majority	
18	needed for important UN budget votes with a group	
19	of countries that, taken together, pay less than 1	
20	percent of the total UN regular budget.	
21	(3) The disconnect between contribution levels	
22	and management control creates significant perverse	
23	incentives in terms of UN spending, transparency,	
24	and accountability.	

- (4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
  - (5) According to a February 2007 Gallup Poll, 66 percent of Americans think that the United Nations is doing a poor job, the UN's lowest job-approval rating ever in the 54 years that those statistics have been kept. Research polling by another firm in late 2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that the UN is "no longer effective" and needs to be significantly reformed, while 75 percent think that the UN "needs to be held more accountable.".
  - (6) Significant improvements in UN transparency and accountability are necessary for improving public perceptions of and American support for UN operations.
  - (7) Because of their need to justify future contributions from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are not tied to performance.

- 1 (8) Article XVII of the Charter of the United
  2 Nations, which states that "[t]he expenses of the
  3 Organization shall be borne by the Members as ap4 portioned by the General Assembly," leaves to the
  5 discretion of the General Assembly the basis of ap6 portionment, which could be done on the basis of
  7 voluntary pledges by Member States.
  - (9) Unlike U.S. assessed contributions to the UN regular budget, which are statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary contributions.
  - (10) The United States, which contributes generously to international organizations whose activities it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded UN Specialized Agencies.

### 18 SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REG-

### 19 ULAR BUDGET ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS.

- 20 (a) United States Policy.—
- 21 (1) It is the policy of the United States to seek 22 to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budg-23 et of the United Nations from an assessed to a vol-24 untary basis.

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1	(2) The President shall direct the United States
2	Permanent Representative to the United Nations to
3	use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
4	States at the United Nations to shift the funding
5	mechanism for the regular budget of the United Na-
6	tions to a voluntary basis, and to make it a priority
7	to build support for such a transformational change
8	among Member States, particularly key UN donors;
9	(b) Certification of Predominantly Vol-
10	UNTARY UN REGULAR BUDGET FINDING.—A certifi-
11	cation described in this section is a certification by the
12	Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Com-
13	mittees that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget
14	of the United Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis.
15	Each such certification shall be shall be effective for a pe-
16	riod of no more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked
17	by the Secretary, with notice to the Appropriate Congres-
18	sional Committees, if the underlying circumstances change
19	so as not to warrant such certification.
20	(e) WITHHOLDING OF NONVOLUNTARY CONTRIBU-
21	TIONS.—
22	(1) Beginning 2 years after the effective date of
23	this act and notwithstanding any other provision of
24	law, no funds may be obligated or expended for a
25	United States assessed contribution to the regular

- 1 budget of the United Nations in an amount greater
- 2 than 50 percent of the United States share of as-
- 3 sessed contributions for the regular budget of the
- 4 United Nations unless there is in effect a certifi-
- 5 cation by the Secretary, as described in paragraph
- 6 (b).
- 7 (2) For a period of 3 years after appropriation,
- 8 funds appropriated for use as a United States con-
- 9 tribution to the regular budget of the United Na-
- tions but withheld from obligation and expenditure
- pursuant to paragraph (1) may be obligated and ex-
- pended for that purpose upon the certification de-
- scribed in paragraph (b). After 3 years, in the ab-
- sence of such certification, those funds shall revert
- to the United States Treasury.
- 16 SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES
- 17 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REGULAR BUDGET
- 18 OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
- 19 (a) Detailed Itemization.—The annual congres-
- 20 sional budget justification shall include a detailed itemized
- 21 request in support of the contribution of the United States
- 22 to the regular budget of the United Nations.
- 23 (b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.—The
- 24 detailed itemization required under subsection (a) shall—

1	(1) contain information relating to the amounts	
2	requested in support of each of the various sections	
3	and titles of the regular budget of the United Na-	
4	tions; and	
5	(2) compare the amounts requested for the cur-	
6	rent year with the actual or estimated amounts con-	
7	tributed by the United States in previous fiscal years	
8	for the same sections and titles.	
9	(c) Adjustments and Notification.—If the	
10	United Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular as-	
11	sessed budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time	
12	such adjustment is presented to the Advisory Committee	
13	on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ),	
14	notify and consult with the appropriate congressional com-	
15	mittees.	
16	TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND	
17	ACCOUNTABILITY FOR	
18	UNITED STATES CONTRIBU-	
19	TIONS TO THE UNITED NA-	
20	TIONS	
21	SEC. 201. FINDINGS.	
22	The Congress makes the following findings:	
23	(1) As underscored by continuing revelations of	
24	waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and account-	
25	ability mechanisms within the United Nations sys-	

- tem remain significantly deficient, despite decades of reform attempts, including those initiated by Secretaries-General of the United Nations.
  - (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any Secretary-General of the United Nations to promote institutional transparency and accountability within the United Nations System, the Secretary-General lacks the power to impose far reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the General Assembly.
  - (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional contributions to the UN system, have repeatedly and successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and scrutiny of UN system operations and expenditures.
  - (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, including the United States, lack access to reasonably detailed, reliable information that would allow them to determine how their contributions have been spent by various UN system entities, further contributing to the lack of accountability within the UN system.

#### SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

2 In this title:

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- 3 (1)UNITED ENTITY.—The NATIONS 4 "United Nations Entity" means any UN agency, 5 commission, conference, council, court, department, 6 forum, fund, institute, office, organization, partner-7 ship, program, subsidiary body, tribunal, trust, uni-8 versity or academic body, related organization or 9 subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies the UN 10 flag or is authorized to use the UN logo, including 11 but not limited to those UN affiliated agencies and 12 bodies identified as recipients of United States con-13 tributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John 14 Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-15 cal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364).
  - (2) United Nations System" means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities, as defined in paragraph (1).
  - (3) United States Contribution" means an assessed or voluntary contribution, whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United States federal government to a United Nations Entity, including contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by a United Nations Entity. United States Con-

- tributions include, but are not limited to, those contributions identified pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364).
  - (4) Transparency Certification.—The term "Transparency Certification" means an annual, written affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity that the Entity will cooperate with the Inspector General, including by providing the Inspector General, upon request, with full access to Oversight Information as defined in this title.
    - (5) Oversight Information.—The term "Oversight Information" includes—
      - (A) internally and externally commissioned audits, program reviews, performance reports, and evaluations;
      - (B) financial statements, records, and billing systems;
      - (C) program budgets and program budget implications, including revised estimates and reports produced by or provided to the Secretary General and the Secretary General's agents on budget related matters;

1	(D) operational plans, budgets, and budg-
2	etary analyses for peacekeeping operations;
3	(E) analyses and reports regarding the
4	scale of assessments;
5	(F) databases and other data systems con-
6	taining financial or programmatic information;
7	(G) documents or other records alleging or
8	involving improper use of resources, mis-
9	conduct, mismanagement, or other violations of
10	rules and regulations applicable to the United
11	Nations Entity; and
12	(H) other documentation relevant to the
13	audit and investigative work of the United
14	States Inspector General for Contributions to
15	the United Nations System.
16	SEC. 203. ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE OF-
17	FICE OF THE UNITED STATES INSPECTOR
18	GENERAL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
19	UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.
20	(a) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to
21	make possible the independent and objective conduct of
22	audits and investigations relating to United States Con-
23	tributions to the United Nations System and the use of
24	those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an ef-
25	fort to eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the

- 1 use of those contributions, and thereby to contribute to
- 2 the development of greater transparency, accountability,
- 3 and internal controls throughout the United Nations Sys-
- 4 tem.
- 5 (b) Establishment.—There is hereby established
- 6 the Office of the United States Inspector General for Con-
- 7 tributions to the United Nations System.
- 8 (c) Inspector General.—
- 9 (1) APPOINTMENT.—The head of the Office of
- the United States Inspector General for Contribu-
- tions to the United Nations System is the Inspector
- General for Contributions to the United Nations
- 13 System, who shall be appointed by the President, by
- and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on
- the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in ac-
- 16 counting, auditing, financial analysis, law, manage-
- 17 ment analysis, public administration, or investiga-
- tions.
- 19 (2) Nomination.—The nomination of an indi-
- vidual as Inspector General shall be made not later
- 21 than 30 days after the enactment of this Act.
- 22 (3) Removal.—The Inspector General may be
- removed from office by the President. The President
- shall communicate the reasons for any such removal
- to both Houses of Congress.

1	(4) Compensation.—The annual rate of basic
2	pay of the Inspector General shall be the annual rate
3	of basic pay provided for positions at level IV of the
4	Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5,
5	United States Code.
6	(5) Relationship to Board.—
7	(A) Except as provided in paragraph (B),
8	the Inspector General shall report directly to
9	and be under the general supervision of, the
10	Board of Directors created in paragraph (d).
11	(B) Neither the Board, any officer of the
12	Board, nor any officer of a federal department
13	or agency shall prevent or prohibit the Inspec-
14	tor General from initiating, carrying out, or
15	completing any audit or investigation.
16	(6) Duties.—
17	(A) It shall be the duty of the Inspector
18	General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate
19	audits and investigations of—
20	(i) the treatment, handling, expendi-
21	ture, and use of United States Contribu-
22	tions by and to United Nations Entities;
23	and
24	(ii) the adequacy of accounting, over-
25	sight, and internal control mechanisms at

1	United Nations Entities that receive
2	United States Contributions.
3	(B) The Inspector General shall establish,
4	maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures,
5	and controls as the Inspector General considers
6	appropriate to discharge the duty under para-
7	graph (A).
8	(C) The Inspector General shall carry out
9	the duties specified in paragraphs (A) and (B)
10	in accordance with section 4(b)(1) of the In-
11	spector General Act of 1978.
12	(D) The Inspector General shall collect
13	and maintain current records regarding Trans-
14	parency Certifications by all United Nations
15	Entities that receive United States Contribu-
16	tions.
17	(E) The Inspector General shall keep the
18	Board of Directors and the Congress fully and
19	promptly informed of how United Nations Enti-
20	ties are spending United States Contributions
21	by means of reports, testimony, and briefings.
22	(F) Referrals.—
23	(i) The Inspector General shall
24	promptly report to the U.S. Attorney Gen-
25	eral when Inspector General has reason-

1	able grounds to believe a U.S. federal
2	criminal law has been violated by a United
3	Nations Entity or one of its employees,
4	contractors, or representatives.
5	(ii) The Inspector General shall
6	promptly report, when appropriate, to the
7	Secretary General or the head of the ap-
8	propriate United Nations Entity cases
9	where the Inspector General reasonably be-
10	lieves that mismanagement, misfeasance,
11	or malfeasance is likely to have taken place
12	within a United Nations Entity and dis-
13	ciplinary proceedings are likely justified.
14	(7) Personnel, facilities, and other re-
15	SOURCES.—
16	(A) The Inspector General may select, ap-
17	point, and employ such officers and employees
18	as may be necessary for carrying out the duties
19	of the Inspector General.
20	(B) The Inspector General may obtain
21	services as authorized by section 3109 of title
22	5, United States Code, at daily rates not to ex-
23	ceed the equivalent rate prescribed for grade
24	GS-15 of the General Schedule by section 5332

of such title.

- 1 (C) The Inspector General may lease, pur-2 chase, or otherwise acquire, improve, and use 3 such real property wherever situated, as may be 4 necessary for carrying out this section.
  - (D) To the extent and in such amounts as may be provided in advance by appropriations Acts, the Inspector General my enter into contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other services with public agencies and with private persons, and make such payments as may be necessary to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.
  - (E) Upon request by the Inspector General, the head of an agency may detail any employee of such agency to the Office of the United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations System on a reimbursable basis. Any employee so detailed remains, for the purpose of preserving such employee's allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, an employee of the agency from which detailed.
  - (8) Cooperation by united states government entities.—

1	(A) In carrying out the duties, responsibil-
2	ities, and authorities of the Inspector Genera
3	under this section, the Inspector General shall
4	receive the cooperation of inspectors general of
5	other Federal Government agencies.
6	(B) Upon request of the Inspector Genera
7	for information or assistance from any depart
8	ment, agency, or other entity of the Federa
9	Government, the head of such entity shall, inso-
10	far as is practicable and not in contravention of
11	any existing law, furnish such information or
12	assistance to the Inspector General, or an au-
13	thorized designee.
14	(C) Whenever information or assistance re-
15	quested by the Inspector General is, in the
16	judgment of the Inspector General, unreason
17	ably refused or not provided, the Inspector Gen-
18	eral shall report the circumstances to the Board
19	of Directors and to the Appropriate Congres-
20	sional Committees without delay.
21	(9) Confirmation of transparency by
22	UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.—
23	(A) PROMPT NOTICE BY INSPECTOR GEN-
24	ERAL.—Whenever information or assistance re-

quested from a United Nations Entity by the

Inspector General pursuant to a Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided in a timely manner, the Inspector General shall notify the Board of Directors, the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing, without delay.

- (B) Notice of compliance.—If and when the information or assistance being sought by the Inspector General in connection with a notification pursuant to paragraph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the Inspector General, the Inspector General shall so notify in writing the United Nations Entity, the Board of Directors, and the Appropriate Congressional Committees.
- (C) Noncompliance.—If the information or assistance being sought by the Inspector General in connection with a notification pursuant to paragraph (A) is not provided to the satisfaction of the Inspector General within 90 days of that notification, then the United Nations Entity that is the subject of the notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its

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Transparency Certification, and the Inspector General shall provide prompt, written notification of that fact to the Board of Directors, Appropriate Congressional Committees, the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any office or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations Entity with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 years.

(D)RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.— After the situation has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Board of Directors, a finding of Transparency Certification noncompliance pursuant to paragraph (B) may be reversed by an affirmative vote of at least 5 of the 7 members of the Board of Directors. The Board shall promptly provide notification of such restoration, along with a description of the basis for the Board's decision, to the Inspector General, Appropriate Congressional Committees, head of the affected United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and the head of any office or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations Entity with any 1 United States Contribution during the prior 2 2 years.

(E) Cost Reimbursement.—The Inspector General may reimburse United Nations Entities for the reasonable cost of providing to the Inspector General information or assistance sought pursuant to a Transparency Certification for the purpose of performing the duties described in paragraph (6).

### (10) Reports.—

- (A) AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION RE-PORTS.—Promptly upon completion, the Inspector General shall provide copies of each audit and investigation report completed pursuant to paragraph (6) to the Board of Directors, the Appropriate Congressional Committees, and, to the extent permissible under United States law, the head of each United Nations Entity that is the subject of that particular report.
- (B) Semiannual Reports.—Not later than May 30, 2008, and semiannually thereafter, the Inspector General shall submit to the Appropriate Congressional Committees a report that, among other things—

1	(i) meets the requirements of section
2	5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978;
3	and
4	(ii) includes a list of and detailed de-
5	scription of the circumstances surrounding
6	any notification of noncompliance issued
7	pursuant to paragraph 9(C) during the
8	covered timeframe, and whether and when
9	Board of Directors has reversed such find-
10	ing of noncompliance.
11	(C) Prohibited disclosures.—Nothing
12	in this subsection shall be construed to author-
13	ize the public disclosure of information that
14	is—
15	(i) specifically prohibited from disclo-
16	sure by any other provision of law;
17	(ii) specifically required by Executive
18	order to be protected from disclosure in
19	the interest of national defense or national
20	security or in the conduct of foreign af-
21	fairs; or
22	(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal in-
23	vestigation.
24	(D) PRIVACY PROTECTIONS.—The Inspec-
25	tor General shall exempt from public disclosure

1	information received from a United Nations
2	Entity or developed during an audit or inves-
3	tigation that the Inspector General believes—
4	(i) constitutes a trade secret or privi-
5	leged and confidential personal financial
6	information;
7	(ii) accuses a particular person of a
8	crime;
9	(iii) would, if publicly disclosed, con-
10	stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
11	personal privacy; and
12	(iv) would compromise an ongoing law
13	enforcement investigation or judicial trial
14	in the United States.
15	(E) Publication.—Subject only to the
16	exceptions detailed in paragraphs (C) and (D),
17	the Inspector General shall promptly publish
18	each report under this subsection on a publicly
19	available and searchable Internet website.
20	(d) Board of Directors.—
21	(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Office of the
22	United States Inspector General for Contributions to
23	the United Nations System shall have a Board of
24	Directors.

- (2) Duties.—The Board shall receive informa-tion and reports of audits and investigations from the Office and the Inspector General, provide gen-eral direction and supervision to the Office and the Inspector General, and determine the restoration of compliance by any United Nations Entity with its Transparency Certification pursuant to paragraph 9(d).
  - (3) Membership.—The Board shall consist of the Secretary of State (or the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Labor (or the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Agriculture (or the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary's designee), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (or the Administrator's designee), the Secretary of the Treasury (or the Secretary's designee), and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the Director's designee).
    - (4) Chairmanship.—The Board shall be chaired by a board member, and the chairmanship shall rotate among the member departments and agencies on an annual basis. The first chair shall be the Director or designee from the Office of Management and Budget.

### SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBU-

2.	TIONS.
<u> </u>	110110.

- 3 (a) Funding Prerequisites.—Notwithstanding
- 4 any other provision of law, no funds made available for
- 5 use as a United States Contribution to any United Na-
- 6 tions Entity may be obligated or expended if—
- 7 (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipi-
- 8 ent has not provided to the Inspector General within
- 9 the preceding year a Transparency Certification as
- defined in section 202(4); or
- 11 (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipi-
- ent is noncompliant with its Transparency Certifi-
- cation as described in section 203(c)(9)(C).
- 14 (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Non-
- 15 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any
- 16 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United
- 17 States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during
- 18 that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended
- 19 because of the restrictions of paragraph 1, shall be re-
- 20 turned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject
- 21 to reprogramming for any other use. Any such funds re-
- 22 turned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to
- 23 be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
- 24 (c) President Maiver.—The President may
- 25 waive the limitations of this subsection with respect to a
- 26 particular United States Contribution to a particular

- 1 United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if the
- 2 President determines that it is required by the national
- 3 security interests of the United States and provides notifi-
- 4 cation and explanation of that determination to the Appro-
- 5 priate Congressional Committees.

### 6 SEC. 205. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

- 7 There are authorized to be appropriated such sums
- 8 as are necessary to carry out the activities of this title,
- 9 provided that such sums be not less than one half of 1
- 10 percent of the total amount of all assessed and voluntary
- 11 contributions of the United States Government to the
- 12 United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies
- 13 and related bodies during the prior fiscal year, as identi-
- 14 fied pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John War-
- 15 ner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
- 16 2007 (Public Law 109–364).

### 17 TITLE III—UNITED STATES POL-

### 18 ICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

- 19 SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.
- The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 21 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 22 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 23 United Nations to ensure the United Nations publishes
- 24 annually, including on a publicly searchable internet
- 25 website, a list of all UN subsidiary bodies and their func-

1	tions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary
2	and assessed, sorted by donor.
3	SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.
4	The President shall direct the United States Perma-
5	nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
6	voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
7	United Nations to implement a system for the required
8	filing of individual annual financial disclosure forms by
9	each employee of the United Nations and its specialized
10	agencies, programs, and funds at the P–5 level and above,
11	which shall be made available to the Office of Internal
12	Oversight Services and, upon request, to Member States
13	and their publics.
14	SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE
14 15	SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
15 16	SECURITY COUNCIL.
15 16 17	SECURITY COUNCIL.  It shall be the policy of the United States to use the
15 16 17	SECURITY COUNCIL.  It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
15 16 17 18	SECURITY COUNCIL.  It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of
15 16 17 18 19	SECURITY COUNCIL.  It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion would—
15 16 17 18 19 20	SECURITY COUNCIL.  It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion would—  (1) diminish the influence of the United States
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	SECURITY COUNCIL.  It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion would—  (1) diminish the influence of the United States on the Security Council;
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	SECURITY COUNCIL.  It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion would—  (1) diminish the influence of the United States on the Security Council;  (2) include veto rights for any new members of

### 1 SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.

- 2 The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 3 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 4 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 5 United Nations to ensure that Member States may, upon
- 6 request, have access to all reports and audits completed
- 7 by the Board of External Auditors.

### 8 SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.

- 9 The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 10 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the
- 11 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 12 United Nations to ensure that the Secretary General exer-
- 13 cises the right and duty of the Secretary General under
- 14 section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
- 15 nities of the United Nations to waive the immunity of any
- 16 United Nations official in any case in which such immu-
- 17 nity would impede the course of justice. In exercising such
- 18 waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the in-
- 19 terests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation
- 20 or prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly
- 21 under investigation for having committed a serious crimi-
- 22 nal offense or who is credibly charged with a serious crimi-
- 23 nal offense.

### 24 SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

- The President shall direct the United States Perma-
- 26 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the

- 1 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
- 2 United Nations to work toward adoption by the general
- 3 assembly of—
- 4 (1) a definition of terrorism that builds upon
- 5 the recommendations of the December 2004 report
- of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
- 7 Change, and includes as an essential component of
- 8 such definition any action that is intended to cause
- 9 death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the
- purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a
- government or an international organization to do,
- or abstain from doing, any act; and
- 13 (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism
- that includes the definition described in paragraph
- 15 (1).
- 16 SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.
- 17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
- 18 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually for each
- 19 of the next 3 years, the Secretary shall submit to the ap-
- 20 propriate congressional committees a report on United
- 21 Nations reform.
- 22 (b) Contents.—The report required under para-
- 23 graph (a) shall describe—
- 24 (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the
- funding for the United Nations Regular Budget to

- a voluntary basis as identified in section 102 above, and a detailed description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward that end;
  - (2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in the prior sections of this Title, and a detailed, goal-specific description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward those ends;
  - (3) the status of the implementation of management reforms within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
  - (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been eliminated;
  - (5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and streamline the committee structure and its specific recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all";
  - (6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been redirected to new challenges,

1	consistent with such March 2005 report of the Sec-
2	retary General;
3	(7) the continued utility and relevance of the
4	Economic and Financial Committee and the Social
5	Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of
6	the duplicative agendas of those committees and the
7	Economic and Social Council; and
8	(8) whether the United Nations or any of its
9	specialized agencies has contracted with any party
10	included on the Lists of Parties Excluded from Fed-
11	eral Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs.
12	SEC. 308. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.
13	(a) In General.—Not later than 1 year after the
14	date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
15	shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
16	a report—
17	(1) concerning the progress of the General As-
18	sembly to modernize human resource practices, con-
19	sistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary
20	General entitled "In larger freedom: towards devel-
21	opment, security and human rights for all"; and
22	(2) containing the information described in sub-
23	section (b).
24	(b) Contents.—The report shall include—

1	(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human re-
2	sources reforms at the United Nations, including an
3	evaluation of—
4	(A) tenure;
5	(B) performance reviews;
6	(C) the promotion system;
7	(D) a merit-based hiring system and en-
8	hanced regulations concerning termination of
9	employment of employees; and
10	(E) the implementation of a code of con-
11	duct and ethics training;
12	(2) the implementation of a system of proce-
13	dures for filing complaints and protective measures
14	for work-place harassment, including sexual harass-
15	ment;
16	(3) policy recommendations relating to the es-
17	tablishment of a rotation requirement for non-
18	administrative positions;
19	(4) policy recommendations relating to the es-
20	tablishment of a prohibition preventing personnel
21	and officials assigned to the mission of a Member
22	State to the United Nations from transferring to a
23	position within the United Nations Secretariat that
24	is compensated at the P-5 level and above;

1	(5) policy recommendations relating to a reduc-
2	tion in travel allowances and attendant oversight
3	with respect to accommodations and airline flights
4	and
5	(6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the
6	Secretary General relating to greater flexibility for
7	the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accom-
8	modate changing priorities.
9	SEC. 309. LIMITATIONS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBU
10	TIONS TO UNRWA.
11	The Secretary of State may not contribute annually
12	to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pal-
13	estine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in an
14	amount—
15	(1) greater than the highest annual contribu-
16	tion to UNRWA made by a member country of the
17	League of Arab States;
18	(2) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA
19	budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget
20	for the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
21	ugees (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or
22	(3) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget
23	of UNRWA

### 1 SEC. 310. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

2	The United States shall withhold from United States
3	contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United
4	Nations for a biennial period amounts that are propor-
5	tional to the percentage of such budget that are expended
6	with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty
7	monitoring body or committee that was established by—
8	(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an
9	international covenant (without any protocols) to
10	which the United States is not party; or
11	(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if
12	the United States is a party to neither.
13	SEC. 311. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
14	(a) Department of State Review and Re-
15	PORT.—
16	(1) In general.—To avoid duplicative efforts
17	and funding with respect to Palestinian interests
18	and to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Pal-
19	estinian issues, the Secretary shall, not later than
20	180 days after the date of the enactment of this
21	Act—
22	(A) complete an audit of the functions of
23	the entities listed in paragraph (2); and
24	(B) submit to the appropriate congres-
25	sional committees a report containing audit
26	findings and conclusions, and recommendations

1	for the elimination of such duplicative entities
2	and efforts.
3	(2) Entities.—The entities referred to in
4	paragraph (1) are the following:
5	(A) The United Nations Division for Pales-
6	tinian Rights.
7	(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the
8	Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
9	(C) The United Nations Special Coordi-
10	nator for the Middle East Peace Process and
11	Personal Representative to the Palestine Lib-
12	eration Organization and the Palestinian Au-
13	thority.
14	(D) The NGO Network on the Question of
15	Palestine.
16	(E) The Special Committee to Investigate
17	Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
18	the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the
19	Occupied Territories.
20	(F) Any other entity the Secretary deter-
21	mines results in duplicative efforts or funding
22	or fails to ensure balance in the approach to
23	Israeli-Palestinian issues.
24	(b) Implementation by Permanent Representa-
25	TIVE.—

- 1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct
  2 the United States Permanent Representative to the
  3 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence
  4 of the United States at the United Nations to seek
  5 the implementation of the recommendations con6 tained in the report required under subsection
  7 (b)(1).
- 9 (2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such rec-9 ommendations have been implemented, the United 10 States shall withhold from United States contribu-11 tions to the regular assessed budget of the United 12 Nations for a biennial period amounts that are pro-13 portional to the percentage of such budget that are 14 expended for such entities.
- 15 (c) GAO AUDIT.—The Comptroller General of the 16 United States of the Government Accountability Office 17 shall conduct an audit of—
- 18 (1) the status of the implementation of the rec-19 ommendations contained in the report required 20 under subsection (b)(1); and
- 21 (2) United States actions and achievements 22 under subsection (c).
- 23 SEC. 312. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.
- The President shall direct the United States perma-25 nent representative to the United Nations to use the voice,

1	vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na-
2	tions to make every effort to—
3	(1) ensure the issuance and implementation of
4	a directive by the Secretary General or the Secre-
5	tariat, as appropriate, that—
6	(A) requires all employees of the United
7	Nations and its specialized agencies to officially
8	and publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements
9	made at any session of the United Nations or
10	its specialized agencies, or at any other session
11	sponsored by the United Nations;
12	(B) requires employees of the United Na-
13	tions and its specialized agencies, programs,
14	and funds to be subject to punitive action, in-
15	cluding immediate dismissal, for making anti-
16	Semitic statements or references;
17	(C) proposes specific recommendations to
18	the General Assembly for the establishment of
19	mechanisms to hold accountable employees and
20	officials of the United Nations and its special-
21	ized agencies, programs, and funds, or Member
22	States, that make such anti-Semitic statements
23	or references in any forum of the United Na-

tions or of its specialized agencies;

- 1 (D) continues to develop and implements
  2 education awareness programs about the Holo3 caust and anti-Semitism throughout the world,
  4 as part of an effort to combat intolerance and
  5 hatred; and
  6 (E) requires the Office of the United Na
  - tions High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop programming and other measures that address anti-Semitism;
  - (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph (1)(C); and
- (3) continue working toward further reduction
   of anti-Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions
   in the United Nations and its specialized agencies,
   programs, and funds.

#### 17 SEC. 313. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL.

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to expand the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations to include
Israel as a permanent member with full rights and privileges.

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# 1 TITLE IV—UNITED NATIONS 2 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

3 SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

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- 4 The Congress makes the following findings:
- 5 (1) The United Nations Human Rights Council, 6 established in 2006 to replace the problematic UN 7 Human Rights Commission, has failed to meaning-8 fully promote the protection of internationally recog-9 nized human rights during its first year of oper-10 ation.
  - (2) The UN Human Rights Council suffers from significant structural flaws, such as the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse result that a number of the world's worst human rights abusers are members of the council.
  - (3) The structure and composition of the UN Human Rights Council has made it subject to gross political manipulation, with the result that, during its first year of operation, the Council passed 9 resolutions censuring the democratic state of Israel, while failing to condemn any severe, ongoing human rights abuses, such as in Sudan, North Korea, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Belarus, or elsewhere.

1	SEC. 402. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND
2	FUNDING.
3	(a) In General.—For each and every fiscal year
4	subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Sec-
5	retary of State submits to Congress a certification that
6	the requirements described in subsection (b) have been
7	satisfied—
8	(1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from
9	a United States contribution each fiscal year to a
10	regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Na-
11	tions an amount that is equal to the percentage of
12	such contribution that the Secretary determines
13	would be allocated by the United Nations to support
14	the United Nations Human Rights Council;
15	(2) the Secretary of State shall not make a vol-
16	untary contribution to the United Nations Human
17	Rights Council; and
18	(3) the United States shall not run for a seat
19	on the United Nations Human Rights Council.
20	(b) Certification.—The annual certification re-
21	ferred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by the
22	Secretary to Congress that the United Nations Human
23	Rights Council does not include a Member State—
24	(1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
25	(2) under a Security Council-mandated inves-
26	tigation for human rights abuses:

1	(3) subject, within the prior 5 years, to a coun-
2	try-specific resolution passed under Agenda Item 9
3	by the former UN Human Rights Commission;
4	(4) which the Secretary of State has deter-
5	mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Ad-
6	ministration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pur-
7	suant to the International Emergency Economic
8	Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control
9	Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
10	1961, or other provision of law, is a government that
11	has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter-
12	national terrorism; or
13	(5) which the President has designated as a
14	country of particular concern for religious freedom
15	under section 402(b) of the International Religious
16	Freedom Act of 1998.
17	TITLE V—INTERNATIONAL
18	ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
19	SEC. 501. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.
20	(a) Enforcement and Compliance.—
21	(1) Office of compliance.—
22	(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President
23	shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
24	resentative to International Atomic Energy
25	Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influ-

1	ence of the United States at the IAEA to estab-
2	lish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat
3	of the IAEA.
4	(B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compli-
5	ance shall—
6	(i) function as an independent body
7	composed of technical experts who shall
8	work in consultation with IAEA inspectors
9	to assess compliance by IAEA Member
10	States and provide recommendations to the
11	IAEA Board of Governors concerning pen-
12	alties to be imposed on IAEA Member
13	States that fail to fulfill their obligations
14	under IAEA Board resolutions;
15	(ii) base its assessments and rec-
16	ommendations on IAEA inspection reports;
17	and
18	(iii) shall take into consideration in-
19	formation provided by IAEA Board Mem-
20	bers that are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons
21	states as recognized by the Treaty on the
22	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21
23	UST 483) (commonly referred to as the
24	"Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty" or the
25	"NPT").

- 1 (C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance
  2 shall be staffed from existing personnel in the
  3 Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the
  4 Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of
  5 the IAEA.
  - (2) Committee on Safeguards and Verification.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on Safeguards and Verification established in 2005 shall develop and seek to put into force a workplan of concrete measures that will—
    - (A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and
    - (B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the verification mechanisms and authorities contained in the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to detect with a high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear activities by a Member State.

1	(3) Penalties with respect to the IAEA.—
2	(A) In general.—The President shall di-
3	rect the United States Permanent Representa-
4	tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in-
5	fluence of the United States at the IAEA to en-
6	sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is
7	under investigation for a breach of or non-
8	compliance with its IAEA obligations or the
9	purposes and principles of the Charter of the
10	United Nations has its privileges suspended, in-
11	cluding—
12	(i) limiting its ability to vote on its
13	case;
14	(ii) being prevented from receiving
15	any technical assistance; and
16	(iii) being prevented from hosting
17	meetings.
18	(B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The
19	penalties specified under subparagraph (A)
20	shall be terminated when such investigation is
21	concluded and such Member State is no longer
22	in such breach or noncompliance.
23	(4) Penalties with respect to the nu-
24	CLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.—The Presi-
25	dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-

1 resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 2 influence of the United States at the IAEA to en-3 sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 5 6 shall return to the IAEA all nuclear materials and 7 technology received from the IAEA, any Member 8 State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nu-9 clear Nonproliferation Treaty.

## (b) United States Contributions.—

- (1) Voluntary contributions.—Voluntary contributions of the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
- (2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to—
  - (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are prioritized for countries that have newly established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear programs; and
- 24 (B) block the allocation of funds for any 25 other IAEA development, environmental, or nu-

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1	clear science assistance or activity to a coun-
2	try—
3	(i) the government of which the Sec-
4	retary of State has determined, for pur-
5	poses of section 6(j) of the Export Admin-
6	istration Act of 1979, section 620A of the
7	Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40
8	of the Arms Export Control Act, or other
9	provision of law, is a government that has
10	repeatedly provided support for acts of
11	international terrorism and the government
12	of which the Secretary has determined has
13	not dismantled and surrendered its weap-
14	ons of mass destruction programs under
15	international verification;
16	(ii) that is under investigation for a
17	breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA
18	obligations or the purposes and principles
19	of the Charter of the United Nations; or
20	(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA
21	obligations or the purposes and principles
22	of the Charter of the United Nations.
23	(3) Detail of expenditures.—The Presi-
24	dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
25	resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and

influence of the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and nuclear security activities.

## (c) Membership.—

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- (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the Additional Protocol and—
  - (A) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
  - (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- (2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect the principles described in paragraph (1).

1	(d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President
2	shall direct the United States Permanent Representative
3	to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
4	United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure
5	that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small
6	Quantities Protocol in order to—
7	(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities
8	Protocol;
9	(2) require that any IAEA Member State that
10	has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to
11	sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol,
12	provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its
13	nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest
14	inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
15	(3) require that any IAEA Member State that
16	does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible
17	to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment,
18	or assistance from any IAEA Member State and
19	subject to the penalties described in subsection
20	(a)(3).
21	(e) Nuclear Program of Iran.—
22	(1) United States action.—The President
23	shall direct the United States Permanent Represent-
24	ative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influ-
25	ence of the United States at the IAEA to make

every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions already imposed, makes Iran ineligible to receive any nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not re-lated to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran—

- (A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities;
- (B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with the Additional Protocol; and
- (C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment and reprocessing.
- (2) Penalties.—If an IAEA Member State is determined to have violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran has satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or as-

1	sistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be
2	ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related
3	to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until
4	such time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes
5	such determination with respect to Iran.
6	(f) Report.—Not later than 6 months after the date
7	of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years
8	thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
9	congressional committees a report on the implementation
10	of this section.
11	SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR
12	SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA.
13	It is the sense of Congress that the national security
14	interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear
15	Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov-
16	ernors should recommend, and the General Conference
17	should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu-
18	rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
19	TITLE VI—PEACEKEEPING
20	SEC. 601. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
21	OPERATIONS.
22	It is the sense of Congress that—
23	(1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper-
24	ations have contributed greatly toward the pro-
25	motion of peace and stability for nearly 6 decades

- and the majority of peacekeeping personnel who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by operational failures and unconscionable
- 6 acts of misconduct;

- (2) in response to such failures, in 2000 and 2005, respectively, the Secretary General charged the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi, and his Special Advisor on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, to provide honest assessments of the United Nations' shortcomings and make recommendations that would help restore the confidence of the international community in United Nations peacekeeping operations;
  - (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had nearly 7 years to implement the reforms contained in the Brahimi Report and more than 2 years to implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that both the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly have expressed their commit-

ment "to implementing fundamental, systematic changes as a matter of urgency," a number of critical reforms continue to be blocked or delayed by Members States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status quo; and

(4) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, management, training, conduct, and discipline, must be implemented without further delay.

## 12 SEC. 602. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NA-

## 13 TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:

### (1) Planning and management.—

(A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, and number of United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased substantially over the past decade, an independent audit of each such operation, with a view toward "right-sizing" operations and ensuring that such operations are cost effective, should be conducted and its findings reported to the Security Council.

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(B) Review of Mandates and Closing Operations.—In conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a view toward identifying objectives that are practical and achievable, and report its findings to the Security Council. In particular, the review should consider the following:

(i) Except in extraordinary cases, including genocide, the United Nations Deof Peacekeeping Operations partment should not be tasked with activities that are impractical or unachievable without the cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-facto Trusteeship outside of the procedures established for such under Chapter XII of the UN Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the primary responsibility of the Member States themselves in creating and maintaining conditions for peace.

1	(ii) Long-standing operations that are
2	static and cannot fulfill their mandate
3	should be downsized or closed.
4	(iii) Where there is legitimate concern
5	that the withdrawal from a country of ar
6	otherwise static United Nations peace
7	keeping operation would result in the re-
8	sumption of major conflict, a burden-shar-
9	ing arrangement that reduces the level or
10	assessed contributions, similar to that cur-
11	rently supporting the United Nations
12	Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be
13	explored and instituted.
14	(C) Leadership.—As peacekeeping oper-
15	ations become larger and increasingly complex
16	the Secretariat should adopt a minimum stand-
17	ard of qualifications for senior leaders and
18	managers, with particular emphasis on specific
19	skills and experience, and current senior leaders
20	and managers who do not meet those standards
21	should be removed.
22	(D) Pre-deployment training.—Pre-
23	deployment training on interpretation of the
24	mandate of the operation, specifically in the

areas of use of force, civilian protection and

field conditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has received and understands such training as a condition of participation in the operation.

(E) Gratis military personnel.—The General Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting restrictions on the utilization of gratis military personnel by the Department so that the Department may accept secondments from Member States of military personnel with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and other operational specialties.

## (2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.—

(A) Adoption of a uniform code of Conduct conduct.—A single, uniform code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of

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category or rank, including military personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into legal documents governing participation in such an operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.

- (B) Understanding the code of conduct.—All personnel, regardless of category or rank, should receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition to periodic follow-on training. In particular—
  - (i) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be provided with a personal copy of the Code of Conduct that has been translated into the national language of such personnel, regardless of whether such language is an official language of the United Nations;
  - (ii) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should sign an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, and that each understands the consequences of violating the

Code of Conduct, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability for victims compensation, as a condition of appointment to any such operation; and

(iii) peacekeeping operations should conduct educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based, including explaining prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and identifying the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.

(C) Monitoring mechanisms mechanisms.—Dedicated monitoring mechanisms, such as the Personnel Conduct Units already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each

1	operation to monitor compliance with the Code
2	of Conduct, and—
3	(i) should report simultaneously to the
4	Head of Mission, the United Nations De-
5	partment of Peacekeeping Operations, and
6	the Associate Director of OIOS for Peace-
7	keeping Operations (established under sec-
8	tion $1114(b)(9)$ ; and
9	(ii) should be tasked with designing
10	and implementing mission-specific meas-
11	ures to prevent misconduct, conduct follow-
12	on training for personnel, coordinate com-
13	munity outreach programs, and assist in
14	investigations, as OIOS determines nec-
15	essary and appropriate.
16	(D) Investigations.—A permanent, pro-
17	fessional, and independent investigative body
18	should be established and introduced into
19	United Nations peacekeeping operations. In
20	particular—
21	(i) the investigative body should in-
22	clude professionals with experience in in-
23	vestigating sex crimes, as well as experts
24	who can provide guidance on standards of

1	proof and evidentiary requirements nec-
2	essary for any subsequent legal action;
3	(ii) provisions should be included in
4	all Memorandums of Understanding, in-
5	cluding a Model Memorandum of Under-
6	standing, that obligate Member States that
7	contribute troops to a peacekeeping oper-
8	ation to designate a military prosecutor
9	who will participate in any investigation
10	into credible allegations of misconduct
11	brought against an individual of such
12	Member State, so that evidence is collected
13	and preserved in a manner consistent with
14	the military law of such Member State;
15	(iii) the investigative body should be
16	regionally based to ensure rapid deploy-
17	ment and should be equipped with modern
18	forensics equipment for the purpose of
19	positively identifying perpetrators and,
20	where necessary, for determining paternity;
21	and
22	(iv) the investigative body should re-
23	port directly to the Associate Director of
24	OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, while
25	providing copies of any reports to the De-

1	partment of Peacekeeping Operations, the
2	Head of Mission, and the Member State
3	concerned.
4	(E) Follow-up.—A dedicated unit, simi-
5	lar to the Personnel Conduct Units, staffed and
6	funded through existing resources, should be es-
7	tablished within the headquarters of the United
8	Nations Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
9	ations and tasked with—
10	(i) promulgating measures to prevent
11	misconduct;
12	(ii) receiving reports by field per-
13	sonnel and coordinating the Department's
14	response to allegations of misconduct; and
15	(iii) gathering follow-up information
16	on completed investigations, particularly by
17	focusing on disciplinary actions against the
18	individual concerned taken by the United
19	Nations or by the Member State that is
20	contributing troops to which such indi-
21	vidual belongs, and sharing such informa-
22	tion with the Security Council, the Head of
23	Mission, and the community hosting the
24	peacekeeping operation.

(F) Financial liability and victims
assistance.—Although peacekeeping operations should provide immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, the responsibility for providing longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with the individual found guilty of the misconduct.

In particular, the following reforms should be implemented:

- (i) The United Nations should not assume responsibility for providing long-term treatment or compensation by creating a "Victims Trust Fund", or any other such similar fund, financed through assessed contributions to United Nations peace-keeping operations, thereby shielding individuals from personal liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of impunity.
- (ii) If an individual responsible for misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide assistance, responsibility for providing assistance to a victim should be assigned to the Member State that contributed the contingent to which such indi-

vidual belonged or to the manager concerned.

- (iii) In the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, appropriate funds shall be withheld from the troop contributing country concerned.
- (iv) In the case of misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor of the United Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished from such individual or fines shall be imposed against such individual, consistent with existing United Nations Staff Rules, and retirement funds shall not be shielded from liability.
- (G) Managers and commanders manner in which managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by those serving under them should be included in their individual performance evaluations, so that managers and commanders who take decisive action to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create a permissive environment or impede investigations are penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.

- (H) Data base.—A centralized data base, including personnel photos and fingerprints, should be created and maintained within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations without further delay to track cases of misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities, regardless of category or rank, are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations.
  - (I) COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES.—
    If a Member State routinely refuses to cooperate with the directives contained herein or acts to shield its nationals from personal liability, that Member State should be barred from contributing troops or personnel to future peace-keeping operations.
  - (J) Welfare.—Peacekeeping operations should continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions of service, while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare payments currently provided to Member States

that contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational facilities, as necessary and appropriate.

SEC. 603. CERTIFICATION.

- 5 (a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Oper-6 ations Contingent Upon Presidential Certifi-7 cation of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.—
- 8 (1) No new or expanded peacekeeping op-9 erations.—
  - (A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State certifies that the requirements described in paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose the creation of new, or expansion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping operations.
  - (B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The requirements described under paragraph (2) may be waived with respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the President determines that failure to deploy new or additional peacekeepers in such situation will create a sig-

nificant possibility of the widespread loss of human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national security interest of the United States. If the President makes such a determination, the President shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional committees of such determination and resulting waiver.

- (2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPER-ATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly, as appropriate:
  - (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, has been adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of Understanding, and mechanisms have been estab-

lished for training such personnel concerning the requirements of the Code and enforcement of the Code.

- (B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and each has been given a personal copy of the Code, translated into the national language of such personnel.
- (C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, are required to sign an oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code, and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability for victims compensation as a condition of the appointment to such operation.
- (D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and implemented educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the part of

United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to identify the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.

- (E) The creation of a centralized data base, including personnel photos and finger-prints, has been completed and is being maintained in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, regardless of category or rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations.
- (F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and each Member State that contributes troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that specifically obligates each such Member State to—
  - (i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct which shall apply equally to all per-

1	sonnel serving in United Nations peace-
2	keeping operations, regardless of category
3	or rank;
4	(ii) designate a competent legal au-
5	thority, preferably a prosecutor with exper-
6	tise in the area of sexual exploitation and
7	abuse where appropriate, to participate in
8	any investigation into an allegation of mis-
9	conduct brought against an individual of
10	such Member State;
11	(iii) refer to its competent national or
12	military authority for possible prosecution,
13	if warranted, any investigation of a viola-
14	tion of the Code of Conduct or other crimi-
15	nal activity by an individual of such Mem-
16	ber State;
17	(iv) report to the Department of
18	Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome
19	of any such investigation;
20	(v) undertake to conduct on-site court
21	martial proceedings, where practical and
22	appropriate, relating to allegations of mis-
23	conduct alleged against an individual of
24	such Member State; and

1	(vi) assume responsibility for the pro-
2	vision of appropriate assistance to a victim
3	of misconduct committed by an individual
4	of such Member State.
5	(G) A professional and independent inves-
6	tigative and audit function has been established
7	within the United Nations Department of
8	Peacekeeping Operations and the OIOS to mon-
9	itor United Nations peacekeeping operations.

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